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The truth about better understanding?  
 
Abstract 
The notion of understanding occupies an increasingly prominent place in 
contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, and moral theory. A central 
and ongoing debate about the nature of understanding is how it relates to the 
truth. In a series of influential contributions, Catherine Elgin has used a variety 
of familiar motivations for antirealism in philosophy of science to defend a non-
factive theory of understanding. Key to her position are: (i) the fact that false 
theories can contribute to the upwards trajectory of scientific understanding, and 
(ii) the essential role of inaccurate idealisations in scientific research. Using 
Elgin’s arguments as a foil, I show that a strictly factive theory of understanding 
has resources with which to offer a unified response to both the problem of 
idealisations and the role of false theories in the upwards trajectory of scientific 
understanding. Hence, strictly factive theories of understanding are viable 
notwithstanding these forceful criticisms.  
 
1. Introduction 
The notion of understanding has come to occupy an increasingly prominent place in 
contemporary epistemology, philosophy of science, and moral theory. A central and 
ongoing debate about the nature of understanding is how it relates to the truth. While 
truth—or knowledge, which entails it—has long been thought to be the primary epistemic 
goal, some theorists now think a proper appreciation of the importance of understanding 
calls for a less exacting preoccupation with factivity.1 
The recent work of Catherine Elgin exemplifies the idea that we should ‘dethrone’ the 
centrality of truth when theorising about understanding and the goals of intellectual 
disciplines like the sciences more generally.2 Key to her position is the thought that a 
strictly factive conception of understanding is empirically inadequate. Elgin argues that it 
cannot account for the manifest success of scientific theorising, including the widespread 
 
1 This paper focuses on the relationship between understanding and truth. For recent defences of the 
idea that understanding necessarily requires knowledge see, for example, Sliwa (2015; 2017) and 
Kelp (2015; 2017), with Grimm (2006) and Ross (2020) providing helpful discussion. Another 
debate concerns the relationship between understanding and ability or know-how, with Hills (2016) 
being an influential defender of this connection.  
2 See Elgin (2004; 2007; 2017). While I use Elgin’s view as a foil, other helpful discussions of non-
factive approaches to understanding include: Zagzebski (2001), de Regt (2015), Potochnik (2017) 
and Rancourt (2017).  
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role of idealisations in successful research and the role of false theories in the upwards 
trajectory of scientific understanding. While these considerations have long been discussed 
by philosophers of science engaged in the realism/antirealism debate, what is notable about 
their appearance in this context is how they are used to make a bold claim about the nature 
of an epistemic state—namely the claim that understanding is not factive.  
Using Elgin’s view as a foil, this paper shows that a strictly factive theory of 
understanding has resources with which to explain the essential role of false theories and 
idealisations in science. While the role of idealisations has been increasingly discussed in 
recent work, this paper aims to build on this work by offering a unified response to both 
the problem of idealisations and the role of false theories in the upwards trajectory of 
scientific understanding. By showing how subjects can recover true beliefs from false or 
partially inaccurate inputs, I argue that strictly factive conceptions of understanding can 
capture the epistemic improvements made by inquirers even if they happen to be unaware 
of the falsity of the view in question or the idealised status of the model or law being 
employed. The strategy outlined also holds promise in explaining why a factive account of 
understanding is compatible with the role of non-propositional (and hence not truth-apt) 
representations in the acquisition of understanding. In sum, strictly factive theories of 
understanding can readily overcome a number of their most challenging criticisms.  
2. Theoretical Preliminaries 
We use the term ‘understanding’ in different ways. Elgin’s concern is primarily with 
objectual understanding rather than understanding propositions or understanding why 
something is the case.3 Attributions of objectual understanding are common and familiar, 
taking the form: “x understands φ where φ is a topic, discipline, or subject matter.”4 
It is also important to distinguish, as Elgin does, between the ‘objects’ of understanding 
and the ‘vehicles’ of understanding.5 The former is whatever the understanding is of or 
about—such as chess tactics, the Bronze Age, Zydeco music, and so on. The latter is 
whatever metaphysically comprises the understanding—such as propositions, 
representations, dispositions, and the like. Given that propositions are straightforwardly 
truth-evaluable, a natural starting point for investigating the factivity of understanding is to 
focus on cases in which the vehicles of understanding are propositional. I will return to the 
question of non-propositional representations at the end of the paper. A focus on 
 
3 See, for instance, Khalifa (2013) on the relationship between different types of understanding.  
4 Elgin (2017: 43).  
5 See, also, Greco (2014) on this distinction.  
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propositions as the vehicles of understanding is mirrored in Elgin’s way of putting the 
factivity view she attacks:  
Factivity: “If ‘understanding’ is factive, all or most of the propositional 
commitments that comprise a genuine understanding are true”.6  
The denial of Factivity is a denial of two distinct approaches to the relationship between 
understanding and truth. Strict factive approaches claim that we can fully account for the 
nature of understanding by focusing only on factive cognitive attitudes, such as knowledge 
and the acceptance or belief of true propositions.7 A less strict factive view, sometimes 
dubbed ‘quasi-factivism’, argues that understanding can tolerate some false commitments 
so long as these are peripheral, or so long as most of the commitments comprising the 
agent’s understanding are true.8 In denying Factivity, Elgin rejects both approaches. 
Rather, she claims that understanding can consist, at its core, of false cognitive attitudes—
provided that these are ‘true enough’ for the intellectual endeavour under discussion. 
To fully make sense of Factivity, we must bear in mind a further point: understanding 
has a subject. In other words, understanding is an epistemic state that is possessed by 
epistemic agents.9 To illustrate what I mean, consider that a history textbook might contain 
many propositions about the Peloponnesian War apt to confer understanding to an 
interested reader. However, it is not the case that the textbook understands the 
Peloponnesian War. Talk of books containing epistemic states like knowledge or 
understanding is just an attenuated way of saying something like ‘a reader can acquire 
knowledge or understanding from this book’.10 So, when we discuss the vehicles of 
understanding (here we are concerned with propositions) concerning some object (e.g. 
Zydeco music) we must remember to think of these in the context of being cognitively 
endorsed by an epistemic agent. 
 
6 Ibid. 37. 
7 See, e.g., Strevens (2008; 2013), Greco (2014), Khalifa (2017), Lawler (forthcoming), and Nawar 
(forthcoming) for those who can be read as sympathetic to a strictly factive view. See Sliwa (2015, 
2017) and Kelp (2015, 2017) for a focus on knowledge.  
8 For example, see Kvanvig (2003); Mizrahi (2012). 
9 Here, taking the simplest case, I focus on individual epistemic agents. However, recent work in 
social epistemology is increasingly sympathetic to the thought that groups can also constitute 
epistemic agents. For instance, Bird (2010) or Ross (2020) discuss the scientific community as an 
epistemic agent capable of possessing epistemic states like knowledge. There has been very little 
discussion of group understanding (although see Boyd 2019), but any approach on which group 
understanding involves the group taking on propositional commitments can, in principle, be given a 
treatment consistent with Factivity. 
10 We also say things like ‘this book contains an understanding of X’ when we mean something like 
it contains an interpretation of X. I won’t be concerned with this type of meaning here.  
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A chief concern for Elgin in denying Factivity is to undermine a foundational view in 
epistemology that she dubs ‘veritism’, namely the idea that truth-conduciveness is the only 
appropriate standard of assessment for epistemic policies, practices, and their products.11 
Rather, Elgin wants to replace veritism with a view on which understanding rather than 
truth is the central aim of many of our epistemic practices, including scientific theorising, 
where understanding does not conform to Factivity but rather is a matter of being able to 
‘exploit information’ and to “know how to wield it to further [one’s] cognitive (and perhaps 
practical) ends.”12  
Before moving on, a final note about epistemic value and the factivity of understanding 
is needed.13 Elgin quickly moves from characterising veritism in terms of the centrality of 
truth-conducive standards of assessment, to equating veritism with a view on which only 
the production of true beliefs has epistemic value. One might question this equation. For 
example, some have argued that we can preserve the core elements of a veritistic 
epistemology even if we agree that there is more to epistemic assessment than asking 
whether or not a given practice generates a strictly true commitment. Warenski 
(forthcoming) defends an ‘ecumenical veritism’, on which veritism is constituted by a 
plurality of truth-related norms rather than an overarching concern with true belief; Le 
Bihan (forthcoming) argues that Elgin’s own view, which focuses on ‘true enough’ content, 
is nonetheless veritistic because partial truth remains the benchmark for epistemic 
assessment, and Nawar (forthcoming) argues that we might preserve veritism as a thesis 
about the value of true belief by taking up an attitude of acceptance rather than belief 
towards the felicitous falsehoods identified by Elgin.  
While the debate over the factivity of understanding is tightly interlinked with debates 
concerning veritism and the epistemic value of truth, they are independent. After all, one 
can argue over whether understanding is factive, quasi-factive, or non-factive without 
taking any stance on the epistemic value of understanding or the cognitive commitments 
that comprise it. In this article I focus only on the question of the factivity of understanding, 
leaving aside any considerations of epistemic value. The ambition of my paper is to show 
that we can accommodate the insights behind Elgin’s work within a strictly veritistic 
framework, eschewing both quasi-factive and non-factive approaches. Nonetheless, readers 
will be able to see for themselves how the conclusion I draw—viz. that understanding is 
 
11 Elgin (2017: 9). 
12 Ibid. 46. 
13 Beyond Elgin, influential early defenders of the idea that understanding has distinctive epistemic 
value include: Zagzebski (2001), Kvanvig (2003), and Pritchard (2009).  
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necessarily comprised of true beliefs—fits into to their commitments regarding epistemic 
value.  
3. Two Arguments against Factivity 
Elgin pushes two distinct lines of thought in order to undermine Factivity. The first appeals 
to the role of idealisation in science. I will outline two influential responses to the 
prominence of seemingly inaccurate idealisations and indicate what are by now familiar 
issues with these responses. The second argument against Factivity appeals to the 
improved understanding afforded by certain ‘felicitous falsehoods’: this argument cannot 
be dealt with by using the familiar responses to the argument from idealisation. After laying 
out these arguments, this paper will show how we can defuse both of them while 
maintaining a factive conception of understanding.  
Before offering my diagnosis of how to defuse these arguments, it is worth flagging that 
I will not appeal to any distinction between belief and acceptance in order to do so. When 
developing her view, Elgin discusses possessing understanding both in virtue of having 
certain beliefs and accepting certain theories. Some have argued that closely distinguishing 
belief and acceptance can do important work in defending Factivity against arguments for 
non-factive approaches to understanding.14 For example, if it is supposed that believing 
something that we explicitly take to be false is epistemically unacceptable, it may still be 
possible to accept the same content for theoretical purposes without it having the 
implication that we knowingly believe a falsehood. Here, I will offer a way to defuse 
Elgin’s arguments that is compatible with supposing that understanding is something that 
we possess simply in virtue of full-blooded beliefs in the content of scientific theory. In 
this paper, henceforth, I will move freely between talk of belief and acceptance. 
3.1 The Idealisation Argument   
One of Elgin’s arguments against Factivity appeals to the widespread use of idealisations 
in science.15 Idealisation occurs when scientists devise models which simplify and abstract 
away from what they describe in order to help us theorise about and understand a target 
 
14 See Nawar (2019) and Khalifa (2017: chapter 6) for more on using the belief/acceptance 
distinction in the context of the present debate. For work offering a closer examination of the 
difference between the belief and acceptance and its relevance for understanding, see Dellsén 
(2017).  
15 For further discussion of arguments from idealisation and scientific understanding see, among 
others, Strevens (2008), Bokulich (2011), Mizrahi (2012), Rice (2015; 2019), Potochnik (2017), de 
Regt (2017), Sullivan and Khalifa (2019) Lawler (forthcoming) Nawar (forthcoming), and Frigg and 
Nguyen (forthcoming).  
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phenomenon. A standard example of idealisation is the fittingly named ideal gas law; it 
describes the behaviour of gases composed of molecules that lack extension and do not 
exhibit intermolecular attraction. Such gases cannot exist. So, the thought goes, the ideal 
gas law is actually false. Nonetheless, as Elgin points out, the ideal gas law is at the heart 
of contemporary thermodynamics—it is not an aim of science to replace this law because 
of its idealised nature, despite the fact that, strictly speaking, it fails to accurately describe 
gases. Hence, she concludes, “It is simply not the case that the bodies of information that 
constitute scientific understanding are, or that their ultimate successors can be expected to 
be, composed of truths, with any residual falsehoods occurring only at the periphery.”16 In 
other words, the central and ineliminable role of idealisations in science supposedly 
undermines Factivity.  
This type of argument has received attention elsewhere, including in literatures not 
primarily concerned with understanding. For instance, idealisations have been used as a 
central motivation for antirealism in the philosophy of science.17 One well-known response 
to the problem of idealisations appeals to the idea of ‘verisimilitude’. This line of response 
suggests that while idealisations might not be true there is a sense in which they are ‘closer 
to the truth’ or ‘more truthlike’ than their predecessor theoretical commitments.18 In this 
sense, scientific theories can move closer to the truth while being composed of false 
propositions. Given the roots of this approach in the much-discussed philosophy of science 
due to Popper, there is much to be said about a verisimilitudinarian strategy to defusing the 
objection from idealisation.19 One obvious worry concerns whether it can really deal with 
all of the relevant idealisations; for instance, while we might use a more complex and less 
idealised law to discuss the behaviour of gases, it is unclear that this would be theoretically 
preferable in all cases despite being closer to the truth. However, discussion of this issue in 
detail is orthogonal to our purposes because appealing to verisimilitude does not allow for 
a genuine defence of Factivity. Despite focusing on coming closer to the truth, the 
verisimilitudinarian approach still concedes that the propositions key to an improved 
understanding of the world are indeed false. This is because truth, at least when applied to 
propositions, is not a property that comes in degrees. Hence, to defend Factivity, it is 
 
16 Ibid. 62.  
17 For discussion, see, e.g., Psillos (1999); Bird (2007).  
18 Niiniluoto is a modern defender of the use of verisimilitude in philosophy of science, see his 
(2014) for succinct discussion. See Rowbottom (2015) or Mizrahi (2017) for contemporary critique.  
19 See in particular Popper (1963; 1976). As has been noted elsewhere (e.g. in de Regt 2018) there 
are unanswered questions as to exactly how Elgin’s own view intersects with defences, such as 
Popper’s, of verisimilitude. Indeed, at some points Elgin’s view—appealing to ‘true enough’ 
falsehoods—might naturally be categorised as a verisimilitudinarian view. 
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necessary take on the more ambitious project of vindicating the full-blooded truth of the 
propositions comprising an agent’s understanding.  
A second realist response, one that preserves a commitment to full-blooded truth, is to 
suggest that while the ideal gas law might be strictly speaking false it is nonetheless 
‘approximately true’. So, although <p> may be a false proposition, <approximately p> is a 
true proposition. Hence, by taking this line, a friend of Factivity might suggest that any 
understanding of thermodynamics conferred by the ideal gas law consists in full-blooded 
truths of the form <approximately p1; p2; …pn> rather than in falsehoods.20 This response 
faces a number of difficulties. The first is providing a satisfactory account of what notion 
of approximation we should be working with—there is now a history of failure in 
articulating such accounts with any degree of precision.21 A further issue is whether the 
approximation response can really capture all forms of idealisation. For instance, Snell’s 
refraction law is an idealisation that is true less than 50% of the time. Can it be said to be 
approximately true? It is far from clear that this is plausible. Another problematic example 
comes from idealised models in population biology which (of course, falsely) represent 
populations as having infinitely many members. It is not obvious how we should think of 
the claim that any finite number is ‘approximately’ infinite.  
A third response to idealisations draws on a theory of scientific explanation, the 
difference-making theory (see, in particular, Strevens 2008; 2012 and Khalifa 2017). The 
difference-making view argues that within any causal nexus precipitating some event e, 
only some elements of this nexus are difference-making. For instance, using an example 
from Salmon (1997), Strevens explains that both an errant baseball and the shouts of the 
players are part of the causal nexus that lead to a window smashing (the explanandum). 
However, only the former is a difference-maker in making it such that the explanandum 
holds (the window smashes), even if both cause the molecules in the window to vibrate. 
Similarly, one might argue, as Strevens (2008: chapter 8) does, that the idealisation that 
gases do not collide is not a difference-maker with respect to the fact that gases conform to 
Boyle’s law. 
One tactic for defusing the centrality of idealised falsehoods to scientific explanation is 
to deny that the inaccuracies contained within idealised models are difference-making: 
rather, they are non-difference-makers. Thus, Strevens writes:  
 
20 The most sophisticated version of this view is pressed by Bird (2007). Note that Bird focuses on 
knowledge and not merely truth. See, for example, Saatsi (2019) for discussion and critique.  
21 For example, Psillos (1999: 261–275).  
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An idealizing explanation does not incorrectly represent certain fictional factors as 
making a difference to the explanandum, then, but rather correctly represents certain 
actual factors as not making a difference. For this reason, such an explanation is 
superior to its veridical counterpart […] [Strevens 2012: 456] 
I have some sympathy for this theory.22 Nonetheless, as Lawler (forthcoming: 7) points out, 
it would take further theorising to explain how this theory, which is essentially about 
scientific explanation, relates to the content endorsed by an epistemic subject who 
possesses understanding. Another important project is to evaluate accounts that aim to 
cleanly delineate difference-making from non-difference-making influences.23 Here, I 
press a different type of worry: there is a second argument due to Elgin that seems to elude 
the non-difference-making account. It is to this argument that I now turn.  
3.2 The Upwards Trajectory Argument   
Elgin’s second argument against Factivity starts from the idea that understanding is a 
gradable notion—it comes in degrees. Elgin uses this platitude about understanding in order 
to generate trouble for the thought that only true propositions can comprise our scientific 
understanding. Specifically, she claims that it leaves us unable to account for cases in which 
we endorse certain ‘felicitous falsehoods’ and thereby move upwards along the trajectory 
from ignorance towards a better understanding of some subject-matter. This is endemic 
within scientific education. Consider the following simple case:  
An eight-year-old’s understanding of human evolution might include as a central 
strand the proposition that human beings descended from apes. A more sophisticated 
understanding has it that human beings and the other great apes descended from a 
common hominid ancestor who was not, strictly speaking, an ape. The child’s opinion 
displays some grasp of evolution. It is clearly cognitively better than the belief that 
humans evolved from butterflies. But it is not strictly true. […] [T]he pattern exhibited 
in this case is endemic to scientific education. We typically begin with rough 
characterizations that properly orient us toward the phenomena, and then refine the 
characterizations as our understanding of the science advances. [Elgin 2017: 59] 
As Elgin suggests, it is natural to suppose that the child acquires a better understanding 
when they come to believe the false proposition that humans descended from apes. 
Although learning such a proposition might not be as good as knowing that we instead 
descended from a common hominid ancestor, the falsehood nonetheless contributes to 
one’s understanding of evolution. Hence, it seems, factive accounts of understanding are 
 
22 Although see Rice (2015) for criticism. His critique appeals to optimality models within biology, 
an example to which I return in S.6. 
23 For summary of Strevens’ kairetic model, see Strevens (2012). 
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unable to explain this improvement.24 We can call these scenarios where felicitous 
falsehoods seem to improve our understanding of some subject matter ‘Elgin Cases’.  
It seems to be a non-starter to suppose that the falsehood ‘humans descended from apes’ 
is a non-difference-maker in the proffered explanation, just as the shouts of a collection of 
baseball players is not a difference-maker vis-à-vis the window smashing. If the proffered 
explanation were true, then clearly the false proposition (‘humans are descended from 
apes’) would make all the causal difference the explanandum (‘why humans are thus and 
so’). Moreover, in summarising the difference-making theory, Strevens suggests that the 
irrelevance of false non-difference-makers is secured by the fact that scientists have the 
facility to properly interpret idealised models correctly so as to focus only on the relevant 
and true causal factors.25 But this will not do here: an eight-year-old is not a scientist who 
is applying their knowledge of how to interpret the explanations offered to them.  
Nor can the defender of Factivity respond to Elgin Cases by appealing to the 
‘approximation’ idea that was available in response to the argument from idealisation. Or, 
at very least, that response will not work across the board. I want to bypass any local debate 
as to whether it is approximately true that humans are descended from apes because other 
examples more clearly elude the approximation strategy. To see this, let’s consider another 
example discussed by Elgin. While our original example concerned scientific education, 
Elgin’s objection against factive theories of understanding in fact ramifies to cases in which 
falsehoods are not merely used as a crutch for educative purposes, but actually represent 
the cutting-edge of scientific belief. The example is that scientists improved their 
understanding of the cosmos by adopting a series of false yet comparatively better 
cosmological theories: from Copernicus’ heliocentric model on which the earth has a 
circular orbit around the sun; to Kepler’s model on which the orbit is elliptical; to Newton’s 
model that accounted for gravitational attraction and posited an irregular elliptical orbit; 
and so on to the present day (see Elgin: 2017: 60). Now, one might still suppose that each 
of these theories better approximates the truth than the previous. However, this response 
cannot plausibly be maintained for all predecessor theories. Consider a pre-Copernican 
transition; the adoption of a geocentric model compared to (let’s say) mythical cosmologies 
that explained the movement of the celestial bodies in terms of divine activity. The adoption 
 
24 A different way to respond to these arguments, short of agreeing that false theories afford genuine 
scientific understanding, is to argue the apparently progressive nature of false theories is explained 
by the fact that they afford agents with a sort of procedural understanding (e.g. of how to conduct 
certain experiments) rather than explanatory understanding, or with a sort of proto-understanding 
that is a mere precursor to genuine scientific understanding (see Khalifa 2017: chapter 6 for a 
discussion in relation to phlogiston theory).   
25 E.g. see Strevens (2012: 456). 
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of a geocentric model might reasonably be thought to have constituted progress on the 
trajectory from ignorance towards a sophisticated understanding of the cosmos. Yet, I take 
it, we cannot plausibly say that it is even approximately true that the sun revolves around a 
static earth.  
What we need is a unified way of responding to these two arguments against strictly 
factive conceptions of understanding. The strategy I will propose is a simple one: I argue 
that, on close inspection, the cases of improved understanding Elgin appeals to can in fact 
be explained by attributing new true beliefs to the relevant subject. In the next section, I 
lay the foundations for this response.  
4. Falsehood and the Recovery of Truth 
Elgin Cases both compel and require us to explain the following concession: falsehoods 
can play a valuable role in scientific education. While it is somewhat counterintuitive to 
suppose false testimony to be educationally beneficial, brief reflection shows Elgin’s 
insight about scientific and indeed other types of education to be both correct and 
important—we routinely and often appropriately instruct novices by telling them things 
that are not strictly true.  
I suggest that we can accommodate this insight within a fundamentally veritistic 
framework. Explaining why is an important preparatory step that will enable us to later 
defend a strictly factive theory of understanding. Falsehoods can be useful in the context 
of education for the following reason: directing someone’s attention to a tactically chosen 
falsehood is often a simple way to enable one’s interlocutor to recover true information. 
This educational strategy draws on a very general feature of human communication, the 
fact that listeners are able to recover a variety of different contents from a piece of 
information. This is best appreciated with an example. 
Imagine, for instance, that a bartender in London is making small-talk with a tall blonde 
stranger who has just walked into the bar. The bartender asks the man ‘Where you are 
from?’ and they reply that they are from Helsinki. Let’s now suppose that their response 
was false—the tall blonde stranger is actually from Espoo, a nearby city in southern Finland 
that almost forms a conurbation with Helsinki. They have asserted a falsehood. However, 
assuming the bartender has the ordinary set of associations with Helsinki, there are good 
epistemic and pro-social reasons for the tall blonde stranger to assert the false proposition 
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in this situation.26 Namely, the stranger knows that by stating the false proposition that they 
are from Helsinki, they will thereby convey to the bartender a variety of germane true 
beliefs.27 These include: He is Finnish; He is from Northern Europe; He is accustomed to 
cold winters; and so forth.28 Crucially, were the tall blonde stranger to have truly asserted 
that they are from Espoo, the bartender, probably not knowing the first thing about Espoo, 
would have acquired less in the way of true beliefs about the tall blonde stranger.  
Hence, we can explain the epistemic value of certain tactical falsehoods within a 
veritistic framework. This account of the utility of employing tactically chosen falsehoods 
applies equally to educational contexts. Sometimes in order to convey important true 
beliefs in a way that is economic and easy to digest, it can be effective to do so by focusing 
the attention of your interlocutor on a false proposition tactically chosen to convey these 
truths. Focusing right away on the truth can be epistemically deleterious in the sense not 
only of inviting confusion and unwanted questions, but also in the sense of conveying less 
in the way of true belief. For instance, telling an eight-year-old that humans evolved from 
a ‘common hominid ancestor’ is a likely example of true testimony that conveys less in the 
way of true belief than a tactical falsehood. When exactly we should resort to a tactical 
falsehood rather than the strict truth depends on the situation—particularly on the cognitive 
abilities of one’s interlocutor, and on how important precision is in the relevant context—
but discussing these parameters is not my purpose here. Rather, the main lesson of this 
section is that focusing on a falsehood can involve (and even be an effective way of) 
learning a variety of true beliefs. This is so even while preserving the thought that 
transmitting truth is the ultimate aim of a given communicative exchange, and that the 
acquisition of truth on the part of one’s interlocutor is the evaluative benchmark for the 
success or otherwise of that exchange. By recognising this, we can uphold Elgin’s insight 
about the role of falsehood in education while maintaining the veritistic principle that 
transmission of truth is still the central (and only) epistemic aim.  
The focus on recovery of true content has important affinities with another strategy 
suggested by recent literature. For instance, it has been argued scientists knowingly use 
 
26 Of course, people might not have the associations we (reasonably) expect them to have regarding 
certain pieces of information. Nothing in my discussion turns on this, so long as we grant that there 
are situations in which we can reasonably expect people to have the right associations. 
27 The example still illustrates this point, even if there might be other locutions that convey even 
more true beliefs such as ‘I am from a city in the neighbourhood of Helsinki’.  
28 This point is not wedded to but follows from various popular views of the nature of belief. For 
instance, provided the bartender knows that Helsinki is in Finland, attributing the belief <the stranger 
is from Finland> to the bartender would be warranted both by looking at what the bartender would 




false models to enable them to purposefully extract accurate information about the 
phenomenon under investigation (see, in particular, Lawler forthcoming; and see Rice 
forthcoming for the connection with scientific realism). However, one feature of the idea 
outlined here is that the recovery of true information from false testimony can sometimes 
be both inadvertent and relatively automatic. In this sense, the recovery of true information 
is entirely consistent with it being the case that the endorsement of what Elgin calls a 
felicitous falsehood is entirely unwitting—an agent can unknowingly learn something 
false, but still thereby come to acquire a host of true beliefs about the subject of inquiry. It 
is precisely this fact that makes felicitous falsehoods so powerful within the context of 
education.  
Having taken the preparatory step of explaining how it is possible to recover true content 
from falsehood, we can now turn to defuse the arguments against a strictly factive theory 
of understanding.  
5. Defusing the Upwards Trajectory Argument 
One argument against Factivity was that only a non-factive conception of understanding 
can explain Elgin Cases in which endorsing falsehoods moves us along the trajectory from 
ignorance towards sophisticated understanding.  
To begin to defuse this argument, we can start by reconsidering Elgin’s example 
regarding an understanding of evolution. In this case, the false proposition identified as 
bringing about an improved understanding of evolution was:  
(F) Human beings are descended from apes.  
Let’s immediately grant that the child believes (F) and their understanding of evolution 
increased as a result whatever learning experience caused them to endorse (F). Although 
Elgin’s example has us focus on one particular proposition, we noted in the previous section 
that coming to endorse a (strictly false) proposition can cause an agent to thereby recover 
a number of associated true propositions. Indeed, it is almost inconceivable for an agent to 
have a solitary belief about a given subject-matter.29 With this in mind we can then provide 
an alternative diagnosis, one that preserves Factivity, for the improved understanding in 
 
29 A helpful quote from Braddon-Mitchell and Chalmers illustrates:  
What would it be like to believe that there’s milk in the refrigerator, and nothing else? It 
seems as impossible as having money without the social and economic circumstances that 
give sense to something being money. To believe that there is milk in the refrigerator, you 
have to have enough by way of belief to count as understanding what milk is, what a 
refrigerator is, and what it is for one thing to be inside another. It takes a lot of belief to be 
any amount of belief. [Braddon-Mitchell & Chalmers 2007: 196] 
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Elgin Cases. Specifically, I think the improved understanding afforded by Elgin Cases can 
be fully captured by appealing to true beliefs acquired by the agent in question.  
Some natural examples of the other contents that one would typically come to endorse as 
a result of accepting (F) are the following: 
(T1) Humans have non-human ancestors.  
(T2) Humans descended from hairy creatures that were sometimes bipedal. 
(T3) Humans and apes have a lot in common. 
(T4) Humans are the way they are due to gradual change over time.  
The thing to notice about this list of contents is (at least as generalisations or 
approximations) they are all true. My claim is that it is only in virtue of thereby endorsing 
these or similarly true contents does an agent come to increase their understanding of 
evolution. The child’s understanding of evolution does not consist in their belief in the false 
proposition (F). Rather, this proposition is only instrumentally valuable insofar as it leads 
them to endorse true contents. We can support this conclusion with two distinct lines of 
thought.  
5.1 Tracking 
The first consideration in favour of an entirely veritistic explanation of Elgin Cases is that 
attributions of understanding track the true contents endorsed by subjects, even when 
subjects share belief in the very same false proposition.  
We can tease this out by noting that among children who each believe, falsely, that 
human beings are descended from apes, there can be variation in which associated true 
contents they also endorse. This follows from the observation that, for many propositions 
p, it is impossible to present a list of contents that we must endorse in order to count as 
believing p. There are different explanations for this difficulty. One follows from growing 
scepticism among philosophers and psychologists about the ‘classical’ theory of concepts 
on which concept-possession requires categorising the objects of belief in accordance with 
a discoverable set of necessary and sufficient conditions.30 A second would stem from the 
truth of even a modest version of semantic externalism. As Burge (1979) argues, it seems 
possible to have beliefs about some phenomenon—in his example arthritis—while lacking 
(or even having misconceptions about) certain core aspects of that phenomenon. Which 
explanation we accept is unimportant for our purposes; what matters is that we can readily 
imagine someone who believes (F) while lacking belief in one of (T1) – (T4). For instance, 
 
30 See Murphy (2002: chapter 2) for an overview and discussion of empirical research.  
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we can imagine a young child who lacks belief in (T4) because although they believe that 
humans are descended from apes, they labour under the misconception that this change 
happened all at once such that one evening there were apes and then—POOF!—the next 
morning there were humans.  
My claim is that our attributions of understanding track the true contents of what we 
believe.31 So, imagine two children, both of whom falsely believe that humans are 
descended from apes, but one believes that this was the result of gradual change while the 
other thinks it happened instantaneously. Clearly, the first child who believes that there was 
gradual change has better understanding of evolution than the second who believes the 
change happened all at once. This isn’t merely an intuition, but follows naturally from two 
ideas that have widely been taken to be diagnostic if not constitutive of superior 
understanding: (i) privileging more fine-grained correct explanations for why things are the 
way they are (e.g. see Sliwa 2017), and (ii) having improved abilities to reason and draw 
inferences regarding the subject of one’s understanding (e.g. see Hills 2016). In this case, 
the first child privileges a more fine-grained correct explanation for why humans are the 
way they are (namely, due to gradual change over time), and they will also be better-placed 
to make accurate inferences about human evolution (e.g. about why we see different 
evolutionary changes happening at different points in human history). In sum, attributions 
of understanding seem to track the true contents of what is endorsed even if both agents 
share belief in the very same ‘felicitous falsehood’.  
5.2 Plateauing  
The tracking argument suggests that our judgements about an agent’s degree of 
understanding varies with the true contents of what they believe. Although instructive this 
does not vindicate Factivity, for it may be the case that attributions of understanding also 
increase with the false contents of belief. For example, perhaps it is the case that (i) false 
beliefs by themselves can also supply a modicum of understanding, or (ii) false beliefs can 
supply understanding in conjunction with true beliefs. I argue against these positions with 
a second argument, the plateauing argument. The idea is as follows: false commitments 
only give the appearance of constituting our understanding, in reality understanding 
increases just in virtue of the fact that that coming to accept these commitments causes the 
agent to endorse additional true commitments—increases in understanding occur only if 
the agent comes to endorse additional true content. In other words, our understanding 
 
31 To be clear: we will need to qualify this further (e.g. by focusing on causal beliefs, or beliefs that 
afford us with certain abilities), it is not the case that any true belief on a given subject-matter will 
increase our understanding of it.   
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plateaus with what is truly believed. This suggests that what constitutes an agent’s 
increased understanding is true content that they endorse, with false beliefs playing a 
merely facilitative role, even if the acquisition of the relevant false beliefs is indispensable 
to the causal explanation of how the agent came to acquire understanding in the first place.32  
To test this claim, we should consider our judgements about the following type of case. 
Imagine two children who each believe all of the true contents noted in (T1) – (T4), but do 
not believe that humans were descended from apes. (Let’s suppose that they both start as 
epistemic duplicates, with identical dispositions and abilities. This is of course an 
artificiality, but not a vicious one—we could just as well imagine the same agent in two 
different counterfactual scenarios.) Then imagine that one of them is told that humans are 
descended from apes, comes to believe this testimony, but does not learn or infer anything 
else that could be characterised as true that the other child does not already believe (even 
as a suitably qualified approximation or generalisation). That is, we hold the beliefs of the 
two children entirely fixed apart from attributing an additional false belief to one of them. 
Does the child improve their understanding of evolution in virtue of accepting (F)? It is 
hard to see why this would be the case, as the only thing to distinguish them is a misleading 
commitment. A natural thought might be that learning some false belief could sometimes 
enable us to draw inferences yielding additional true beliefs, thus increasing our 
understanding of some phenomena. Does this mean that the falsehood might (partly) 
comprise our understanding of that phenomena? Although tempting, this idea doesn’t work 
here. As Sliwa (2017: 524-525) explains, it is important to distinguish between the capacity 
to understand and instances of understanding. One can have the capacity to understand 
something without actually (yet) understanding it. In the case in which a false belief puts 
someone in a position to infer truths that would contribute to their understanding, they have 
the capacity to increase their understanding but have not (yet) done so. Only when they 
infer the truth will they exercise their capacity to understand and actually increase their 
understanding. And this, of course, is no problem for Factivity, for it is thus the acquisition 
of a true belief that explains the increase in understanding. Hence, while false beliefs might 
play a causal-explanatory role in why an agent possesses understanding of a given 
phenomenon, it is true beliefs that fully explain why they understand to the degree that they 
do.  
 
32 For instance, the ‘bartender case’ from S.4 is one in which the acquisition of a false belief (‘the 
stranger is from Helsinki’) was a causal prerequisite for the recovery of associated true beliefs. My 
view is that any understanding acquired in this case is nevertheless constituted only by the true 
beliefs, even if the belief in a falsehood is central to the causal story of how the agent came to acquire 




Thus, we see that the addition of (F) does nothing to augment an agent’s understanding 
once we are careful to separate it out from all of the true contents that we can learn by 
focusing on (F). So, not only do understanding attributions track what is truly believed, 
increases in understanding seem to plateau with what is truly believed too. As such, there 
is no reason to suppose that Elgin Cases are any threat to Factivity, the idea that 
understanding is comprised of true contents we endorse.  
I have not settled the question of whether having a false belief could act a negative 
modifier which lowers one’s degree of understanding. To answer this question, we would 
need to compare cases where an agent is agnostic about some proposition against cases 
where an agent has an additional false belief about the phenomena under investigation. 
While it seems plausible that such false beliefs could lower one’s understanding—e.g. if a 
child thought that humans were specifically descended not just from apes, but from 
orangutans, or that humans are descended from capuchin monkeys, which they falsely 
supposed to be an ape—my suspicion is that these false beliefs would only inhibit 
understanding when they precluded an agent from believing some true content we would 
otherwise expect them to have. Understanding, on this view, would be fully determined by 
the true contents of what one believes, even though additional false beliefs might serve to 
prevent an agent from believing certain true contents. This is a preliminary sketch of a 
response to this issue; the negative influence of false beliefs on attributions of 
understanding is an important question for future research on factive theories of 
understanding.33 
5.3. Approximation Revisited  
Before moving on, it is worthwhile to briefly observe that the broader strategy of teasing 
out ‘strictly’ true contents of what agents believe in Elgin Cases succeeds where appealing 
to the idea of approximate truth fails. The earlier example of a problematic case for the 
approximate truth response was that of moving to a geocentric model of the cosmos in 
place of a mythological conception. It is not ‘approximately true’ to suppose that the sun 
revolves around the earth; precisely the opposite is true. However, in coming to believe the 
falsehood that the sun revolves around the earth, we can suppose that early astronomers did 
also come to believe the following sorts of true contents:  
(T5) Many celestial bodies have regular orbits.  
(T6) Many celestial bodies move according to mechanistic laws. 
 
33 My thanks to anonymous reviewers for pressing me on this issue. 
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(T7) Many celestial bodies are not moved by divine willing.  
Again, the factivist about understanding can claim that, to the extent we credit Ptolemaic 
astronomers with an improved understanding of the cosmos, this was only in virtue of their 
coming to learn these truths. This is the case notwithstanding their ignorance about the fact 
that the sun does not revolve around the earth. Moreover, to the extent that we discovered 
that such astronomers did not endorse contents such as (T5) – (T7), we would accordingly 
attribute them a worse understanding of the cosmos than if they had. Again, our attributions 
of understanding track and are explained by the true contents of what is believed.  
6. Defusing the Idealisation Argument 
The remaining argument against Factivity relies on the prominent role of idealisations in 
providing scientific understanding. According to this argument, a factive conception of 
understanding cannot account for the essential role of models and theoretical posits that are 
false because they simplify and abstract from reality. 
Just as with my response to the upwards trajectory argument, I will argue that focusing 
on the recovery of true belief from inaccurate inputs allows us to defuse this argument. My 
analysis will be broadly complementary to the views of Lawler (forthcoming) and Rice 
(forthcoming), who argue that the central role idealisations in scientific theorising is 
compatible with strictly factive views of understanding insofar as scientists who use them 
consciously extract true information from them. However, when defusing the upwards 
trajectory argument, I argued that the recovery of true contents from false theories—and 
hence the acquisition of understanding—can be compatible with ignorance that one is 
considering a false theory. This is why, for example, children can recover true contents 
from theories that they do not realise are false. In a similar vein I will here argue, at least 
in some cases, that something similar holds for idealisations: they permit the recovery of 
true content even if an agent is unaware of the idealised nature of the model or theory. 
Thus, I will vindicate the extraction view by suggesting that it a species of a general fact 
about scientific theorising: the arguments, models, and theories we use provide 
understanding to the extent that they allow an agent to recover true content from them, 
whether wittingly or unwittingly.  
To begin to respond to the idealisation argument, recall one of platitudes we observed 
at the outset—namely, that understanding is an epistemic state that requires a subject. Just 
like beliefs require a believer, and knowledge a knower, understanding presupposes an 
agent doing the understanding. This is why, for instance, a textbook ‘provides 
understanding’ only in the sense that it elicits certain epistemic states in the agents making 
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use of it. Keeping this in mind explains the following rather obvious point: when it comes 
to thinking about the role of prominent idealisations in scientific practice—such as the ideal 
gas law, or models in population biology—there can be variation in how much is 
understood by the individual using the idealised law or model. This is a natural corollary 
to the truism Elgin earlier relied upon in making the upwards trajectory argument, namely 
that understanding comes in degrees. Different scientists using idealised laws and models 
can understand their subject-matter to different degrees.  
The reason this matters is that, since understanding is something possessed by epistemic 
agents, we must interpret the argument from idealisation against Factivity accordingly. In 
this vein, the argument cannot succeed simply by noting that the idealised models or laws 
themselves contain falsehoods. Rather, the focus must be on how idealisations elicit 
understanding in those who use them. And, in order to plausibly undermine Factivity, the 
argument from idealisation must say: it is not possible to explain the understanding elicited 
by idealised models and laws only by appealing to true beliefs acquired by those who use 
them. Put in these terms, so I claim, the argument from idealisations against Factivity will 
turn out less compelling than it initially sounded.  
As has been pressed extensively by Lawler (forthcoming) and Rice (forthcoming), when 
using idealised models and laws, scientists are typically aware of them being idealisations. 
For example, when using the ideal gas law, scientists are aware that the real-world gas they 
are theorising about is not composed of molecules which lack extension. The emphasis on 
this knowledge chimes with comments in Strevens (2012: 456), who suggests that the 
inessential role played by falsehoods in scientific idealisation is partly explained by the fact 
that scientists “know the right way to read idealized models”. These points support the 
following schematic observations: (i) firstly that idealisations, although false, do not 
invariably elicit false beliefs in those who use them, and (ii) that our judgements about 
understanding vary with what is in fact endorsed by the agent using the particular 
idealisation. However, while I agree with these schematic observations, I think that it is 
possible to recover a degree of understanding from an idealised model—just as in the case 
of scientific education—even if one is unaware of its status as an idealisation.34  
As the argument from idealisation is primarily driven by examples, with much of the 
debate turning on the proper interpretation of particular applications of certain models, we 
should consider how scientists use particular idealisations in context. There are various 
 
34 Not everyone agrees. For instance, Greco (2014: 297) suggests that a scientist who was unaware 
of a model’s status as an idealisation would fail to gain understanding of the phenomenon it describes 




noted examples of false idealisations or models conferring understanding. The ideal gas 
law is one, but this example has been widely discussed.35 Another type of example, one 
that has figured in the debate concerning the nature of scientific understanding, is the use 
of models in population biology. Indeed, these have been used by Rice and Lawler to test 
the plausibility of factive views of understanding. For example, one closely analysed case 
is the use of optimality models in biology, such as the attempt to work out the optimal 
copulation time for male dung flies visiting multiple piles of dung in order to mate.36 
However for the sake of any pre-breakfast readers I shall focus on a different optimality 
model.37 To do so, we will need to talk about crows and whelks. 
Crows and Whelks. 
There is colony of Northwestern Crow on Mandarte Island in British Columbia. These 
crows feed on whelks, a type of mollusc that lives in a hard shell. The crows open the 
whelks by dropping them onto a rocky beach; they only select whelks that are above a 
certain size; they almost always drop the whelks from a height of around 5 metres; and the 
crows don’t tend to give up if a particular whelk stubbornly refuses to break after a few 
drops.38 Upon hearing these facts, we—or a zoologist—might be interested in better 
understanding why the crows forage in this way. This is where optimality models can be 
useful.   
Optimality models in biology help us to understand why a given population possesses a 
particular trait, by showing that the trait in question maximises evolutionary fitness in light 
of certain constraints. When it comes to foraging, the relevant trade-offs are calorific; what 
behaviours strike the right balance between energy expenditure and calorie-acquisition? 
The predicament facing our crows is how to achieve the right balance between energy 
gained from eating denuded molluscs and energy expended in upwards flight. Zach (1978; 
1979) provides an optimality model demonstrating that the crows adopt an optimal 
strategy: focusing on large whelks (which provide more calories and break much more 
easily than smaller whelks), dropping them from around 5 metres (which provides the best 
trade-off between likelihood of breakage and calories expended), and being persistent in 
continuously dropping their chosen whelk (because each successive whelk drop is about as 
 
35 See, for example, Strevens (2008); Potochnik (2017); Khalifa (2017); Rice (2019); Sullivan and 
Khalifa (2019); Lawler (forthcoming); Nawar (forthcoming). For a recent defence of a reading of 
the ideal gas law that supports a non-factive theory of understanding, see Doyle et al. (2018). 
36 See Parker (1978) for the empirical data and Sober (2000) or Rice (2015) for philosophical 
discussion.  
37 See Lawler (2019) for a more abstract discussion of strictly factive views in relation to optimality 
models.                                                                                                                                                                              
38 Zach (1978; 1979) provides these empirical observations.  
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likely to succeed as taking a new whelk). Hence, the crows more or less optimise calorific 
gains when whelk foraging.  
Optimality models involve artificial idealisations and simplifications that render them 
inaccurate with respect to the actual causal mechanisms which led to the evolution of a 
given trait within a target population.39,40  With respect to our colony of crows, the model 
used is simplified in various respects. For example, when working out the calorific 
expenditure used in flight, the model falsely supposes that all crow flight is horizontal by 
adopting the simplifying supposition that the higher calorific costs of ascending flight and 
the lower calorific costs of descending flight will roughly cancel each other out. So, in 
order to elide complicated calculations, the model works on the basis of supposing that 
flying higher uses more calories only because it involves flying for longer. This obviously 
isn’t entirely accurate, upward flight is more strenuous beyond simply extending the period 
of flight. Moreover, the calorific expenditure of horizontal flight in the model is calculated 
using a constant base rate; this strips out real world influences like favourable or adverse 
wind conditions or physiological differences that will change the actual level of calorific 
expenditure for a given crow. This isn’t entirely accurate either—there is no single base 
rate that accurately captures how many calories every single crow uses when flying over a 
given time period. In short, the model used does not accurately represent all of the actual 
causal mechanisms influencing the development of the crows’ foraging behaviour. Rather, 
it simplifies and omits various factors for theoretical ease. However, clearly such models 
are useful in helping us better understand the crows’ foraging behaviour; by illustrating 
 
39 Rice (2015: 600) identifies six different ways in which optimality models tend to idealise:  
(1) The model’s mathematical curves, equations, or payoff structures are often idealized when 
compared to the causal processes within the target system(s). 
(2) Idealized strategy sets are intended to capture the relevant alternatives rather than strategies 
actually causally interacting within a population. 
(3) The models’ optimization assumptions do not accurately represent a causal mechanism in 
the system, but only captures the general optimizing tendency of the system in the long run. 
(4) There are idealizations regarding causal mechanisms of inheritance. 
(5) It is assumed that selection pressures do not change over time. 
(6) Infinite population size is assumed to allow for the use of various laws of large numbers in 
deducing the target explanandum.  
40 Our concern here is with factive versus non-factive theories of understanding. However it is worth 
noting that philosophers of science have also been interested in the idealised nature of optimality 
models for what they tell us about a related yet orthogonal debate: on what the nature of scientific 
explanation is, e.g. whether a scientific explanation must accurately represent the causes of the 
explanandum. (For instance, see Cartwright 1983 or Bokulich 2011; 2016 for work on idealisations 
and scientific explanation). There are interesting connections between debates about the nature of 
understanding and the nature of scientific explanation, but here I only discuss the former question. 
For a broader perspective on both of these issues, see book-length treatments in Strevens (2008) and 
de Regt (2017). 
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different types of trade-offs they face, the model helps us grasp why certain behavioural 
strategies are apt to be selected for. 
Although the optimality model itself contains false idealisations, we must remember 
that to determine whether or not Factivity is in trouble we must look at the epistemic state 
it elicits in those using the model. So, is there any reason to suppose that the understanding 
elicited by those using this model must contain false beliefs? The answer, I think, is 
negative. Rather, we can readily explain the understanding elicited by such models by 
appealing to true beliefs. When we think about what is useful about Zach’s optimality 
model, I suggest, we find that it is the fact that it justifies us in adopting the following type 
of beliefs about the Mandarte crow: 
(T1) Selecting large whelks is an effective foraging strategy because those 
contain more calories and are more likely to break than smaller whelks. 
(T2) The disposition to drop whelks from ~5 metres strikes a good balance 
between calorific expenditure and likelihood of opening the whelk.  
(T3) Persistently dropping the same whelk until it breaks is at least as good a 
strategy as selecting a new whelk. 
(T4) Natural selection will tend to favour crows which optimise calorific gains 
when foraging over those which are profligate with their energy. 
All of these beliefs (at least as generalisations or approximations) are true, and they are 
central to the increased understanding about optimal foraging strategies gained from the 
use of the optimality model. (T1) – (T4) are the types of belief that anyone consulting 
Zach’s model would acquire about the Mandarte crow. So far, this corroborates the idea 
that we can explain the understanding gained from an idealised model simply by focusing 
on what is purposively extracted from the model.  
Although the model used to demonstrate why these beliefs are well-founded is simplified 
in various respects, these false simplifications are inessential to the increased understanding 
the model affords us with. Indeed, it is surely possible to recover a degree of understanding 
from such optimality models even if the observer failed to realise that the models were 
idealised in the respects explained above. Consider the following beliefs about the 
simplified false aspects of the optimality model:   
(F1) All crow flight is horizontal.   
(F2) All crows have exactly the same metabolic rate when flying.   
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These false beliefs are not at the heart of why Zach’s optimality model offers us an 
increased understanding of crow foraging. Rather, these simplifications are just ways to 
more conveniently construct the optimality model which acts as a tool for eliciting better 
understanding in those who consult it. Suppose that a reader had simply not noticed that 
the calculations in Zach’s model involved idealised assumptions about horizontal versus 
vertical flight or the uniform metabolic rate of crows. Indeed, I suspect that many casual 
readers would not immediately notice this feature of the model. Would this preclude them 
from understanding why the crow’s chosen foraging strategy optimises calorific gains? I 
think that it would make very little difference, for they would still recover the relevant true 
contents from the model, such as those enumerated in (T1) – (T4). In this sense, I suggest 
that while such an unwitting reader would to some extent misunderstand the nature of the 
model, they would in fact acquire understanding of the phenomenon it represents. Again, 
as with my diagnosis of the upward trajectory argument, I suggest that we would only credit 
such an unwitting reader understanding to the extent that they acquired true beliefs from 
the idealisation. As such, any false belief (or, more realistically, agnosticism) regarding 
(F1) – (F2) would not constitute their understanding, even if they happened to be ignorant 
in this way.   
To sum up: while Elgin is right in claiming that strictly false idealisations are extremely 
useful in scientific theorising, I have suggested that their usefulness consists in being 
convenient tools for eliciting true beliefs that facilitate an understanding of their objects. 
As such, by focusing on how idealisations elicit understanding in those who use them and 
not just on the content of the idealised law or model itself, we can accept Elgin’s insight 
about their usefulness while denying that it creates any pressure to accept a non-factive 
theory of understanding. Notably, idealisations can serve their purpose, at least in some 
cases and at least to some extent, even if an agent is not aware of their idealised status. Of 
course, here I have only discussed one such model. As Sullivan and Khalifa (2019: 679) 
concede in their critique of those who use the ideal gas law to attack Factivity, opponents 
can still maintain that it will be possible to find further examples that do in fact support 
non-factive views of understanding. However, while it is correct to say that the debate must 
be conducted case-by-case, I think that recent work has done enough to put on the defensive 
those who use the argument from idealisation to undermine strictly factive views of 
understanding.  
Further Applications  
The strategy outlined in this paper to defend strictly factive views of understanding against 
cases in which falsehoods seemingly play an ineliminable role in successful theorising has 
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general application. By clearly distinguishing what the epistemic subject believes from the 
vehicle (e.g. a book, a model, a string of testimony) that delivers understanding, we can 
also defend factive views against a further charge: that valorising the importance of true 
propositions leaves us unable to account for the understanding provided by non-
propositional representations which are not truth apt. Moving from scientific to historical 
understanding, Elgin (2017: 103) asks: “Should we deny that works of art afford historical 
understanding because they are not verbal?” She answers her own question in the negative 
as follows:  
There is, as far as I can see, no reason to privilege the verbal over other modes of 
symbolization. And if we do, we exclude not just prints, monuments, and 
documentary films, but also diagrams, charts, and maps. To restrict historical 
understanding to that which is captured in a language would be costly. [Elgin 2017: 
103]  
While I can only provide a thumbnail sketch here, it is easy to see how distinguishing 
between the non-propositional and therefore not truth-apt content of a representation—like 
a diagram or map—can be separated from the propositional and therefore truth-apt content 
that an agent recovers from considering these representations. On the factive view defended 
in this paper, we would seek to explain the understanding afforded by such representations 
by identifying true propositions recovered by the agent using the representation. Thus, 
while we can agree with Elgin that non-propositional representations play a crucial role in 
affording us with understanding, we do not need to suppose that this creates any pressure 
to deny a factive account of understanding.  
A further challenge, relating to the idea of non-propositional understanding, is due to 
Lipton (2009). He claim that we can derive ‘inarticulate’ understanding from using models 
such as an orrery—for example, that we can derive understanding why the planets exhibit 
a certain type of motion without being able to articulate this understanding in propositional 
terms. I lack space to fully discuss this challenge here, but it is worth noting that a strictly 
factive view of understanding might respond by appealing to fact that beliefs do not 
necessarily need to be articulable to count as beliefs. For instance, there are reasons to 
suppose that women living in more benighted times both were capable of knowing that 
sexual harassment was wrong and have some grasp of why it was wrong, despite lacking 
the conceptual framework required to clearly articulate these beliefs.41 It may be the case 
that, similarly, we can have beliefs that contribute to our understanding of a phenomenon 
 
41 See Srinivasan (2020) for a seminal paper on this topic.  
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even in lieu of possessing a conceptual framework needed to articulate them. Further work 
would do well to explore the conditions for attributing beliefs even in the absence of 
articulability to answer Lipton’s challenge within a strictly factive conception of 
understanding.42 
7. Conclusion 
The question of whether or not understanding is factive has been a key faultline in debates 
about the nature of understanding, with a central motivation for non-factive views being 
the thought that only they can account for the manifest success of scientific theorising in 
increasing our understanding of the world. This paper, taking the influential arguments of 
Catherine Elgin as a foil, suggested that a factive conception of understanding does in fact 
have resources with which to overcome two prominent challenges it faces: firstly, the role 
of tactical falsehoods in enabling us to move along the trajectory from ignorance towards 
a more sophisticated understanding of various phenomena, and secondly, the idea that a 
factive view cannot explain the role of idealised models in eliciting scientific 
understanding. Closer inspection of the relevant cases suggested that there was no need to 
appeal to false beliefs in order to explain the increase in understanding. Focusing on a 
tactical falsehood is often an effective way of recovering a variety of true beliefs, even 
when the agent is unaware that they are considering something false or inaccurate. We can 
readily understand idealised laws and models as tools for eliciting true beliefs in those who 
use them rather than as constituting their understanding. In sum, we can agree with the 
insight that falsehoods often play an important role in successful scientific theorising while 
maintaining a strictly factive conception of understanding.43  
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